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Whatever the ﬁnal charge on the UK for leaving the EU, the money
itself is relatively marginal to the former’s public ﬁnances. However, this
charge is politically sensitive and ﬁnancially aggravating during one of
the longest periods of ﬁscal austerity in the UK’s history. The ways in
which leaving is conceptualized have implications for any continuing
ﬁnancial obligations that must be managed within the context of ﬁscal
austerity and political uncertainty. Yet, leaving the EU is a unique
transaction: it is not analogous, for example, to a divorce settlement, the
leaving of a club, the termination of a commercial contract, the leaving of
a treaty-based international organization, or secession from a state.
Analyzing the formulation of the charge in terms of the four modes of
government accounting—ﬁnancial reporting, statistical accounting,
budgeting, and ﬁscal sustainability projections—enhances its ﬁscal
transparency. It evidences not only the weakness and inconsistency of the
UK’s negotiating position but also the dominance in EU thinking of the
short-term budgetary calculations of the 2014–20 Multiannual Financial
Framework over its long-term sustainability without a large net
contributor. The ﬁnal amount paid by the UK will depend on the
resolution of competing perspectives as well as on liabilities and
contingent liabilities associated with the increasingly complex EU
ﬁnancial architecture.
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Commentators compete rhetorically about the portentous nature of the decision
by the UK Referendum on 23 June 2016 to leave the EU. This paper does not
discuss the merits of what has become known as ‘Brexit’ but focuses on the charge
that the UK must pay the EU for its leaving.
The exit process provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon 20071 was designed by the
UK diplomat Sir John Kerr in the aftermath of the failed attempt to create a
European constitution. His recollection (Kerr, 2017) of the negotiations is:
DAVID HEALD (david.heald@glasgow.ac.uk) and IAIN WRIGHT are with the Adam Smith Business
School, University of Glasgow, UK. The authors acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the Economic and
Social Research Council’s Impact Acceleration Account (ES/M500471/1).
1 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/search.html?qid=1523980576401&text=lisbon%20treaty&scope=EURLEX
&type=quick&lang=en
557
© 2019 The Authors. Abacus published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on behalf of The Accounting
Foundation, University of Sydney.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
ABACUS, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2019 doi: 10.1111/abac.12166
Nor do I remember any serious opposition to the idea, enshrined in the Lisbon
Treaty in what became Article 50, that nation-states were entitled to change their
minds, and leave if they so choose. Equally I’m certain no-one dreamed that in 2017
a member state would trigger the procedure, as Mrs. May did on 29 March.
However, once Article 50 had been triggered, the UK’s status changed to that of a
third party, governed by Article 218(3), and certain UK citizens working in EU
institutions ceased to have access to documentation and decisions on the basis of
their allegedly conﬂicted loyalties. Control of the exit process passed to the
European Commission, acting on behalf of the Council of Ministers (i.e., the
governments of the Member States), now the ‘EU27’. Pre-conditions were set that
the Commission would not discuss the UK’s future trading relationship with the
EU until three issues were settled: the treatment of non-UK EU citizens resident
in the UK and of UK citizens resident in the EU27; the arrangements for the
border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; and the exit charge
that the UK would pay.
The UK net contribution to the EU is £8–10 billion per annum (ICAEW,
2017), approximately 1% of annual UK public expenditure. A much-cited early
ﬁgure for the exit charge was €60 billion if leaving on 29 March 2019, which if
added to the UK public sector net debt would increase the net debt/GDP ratio
from 87% to 90%. Before the global ﬁnancial recession, the 2007 ratio was 36%
(ONS, 2018). The draft Withdrawal Agreement (European Commission, 2018)
has been interpreted by the UK’s ﬁscal council as involving an undiscounted
payment of €41.4 billion, assuming a transition period ending on 31 December
2020 (OBR, 2018, para. B.35). Such a charge is small compared with the
potential effects of Brexit on GDP growth and on UK public ﬁnances, for
example due to sterling depreciation and trade disruption. The Institute for
Fiscal Studies estimated the annual budgetary cost as £70 billion (Emmerson
et al., 2016).
Quickly labelled the ‘Divorce Bill’, the exit charge generated considerable
political acrimony, despite its relatively marginal economic impact (Keep, 2017,
revised 2018):
If you were sitting in a bar and if you are ordering 28 beers and then suddenly some
of your colleagues is leaving and is not paying, that is not feasible. They have to
pay—they have to pay. Not in an impossible way, I am not in a revenge mood. I am
not hating British. The Europeans have to be grateful for so many things Britain has
brought to Europe during war after war, before and everywhere and every time. But
now they have to pay (Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European
Commission, 2017).
The sums that I have seen that [the EU27] propose to demand from this country
seem to me to be extortionate. I think that to “go whistle” is an entirely appropriate
expression (Boris Johnson MP, then UK Foreign Secretary, 2017).
I am not hearing any whistling, just a clock ticking (Michel Barnier, EU Brexit
Negotiator, 2017).
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Handing over an allegedly huge sum to Brussels while the British people could
see no end to austerity at home gave the exit charge a high political salience.
Moreover, the EU27 insisted on an early ﬁnancial settlement before negotiations
could move on to trade issues vital to the UK (European Council, 2017). The UK
Government thought that it could deal bilaterally with Member States, by-passing
the European Commission, a tactic which underestimated the cohesion generated
by survival through the eurozone crisis.
Counterfactual history is always problematic, but there is widespread academic
and commentator agreement that post-2008 ﬁscal austerity was a signiﬁcant factor
in bringing about the Brexit result. What was markedly different about the UK
Government reaction to the post-2008 ﬁscal crisis was that it focused almost
exclusively on expenditure cuts rather than the usual mix of spending cuts and tax
increases (Mauro, 2011). Austerity has also lasted much longer than the customary
two or three years of ﬁscal pain, followed by relaxation, that has characterized UK
ﬁscal history over the last 100 years (Hood and Himaz, 2017). Stuckler et al.
(2017) report that austerity has hurt deprived groups through a number of
channels, such as unemployment, poverty, homelessness, and reduced access to
healthcare. Stiglitz (2011) claimed that ‘draconian cuts are causing many
[UK] people to lose hope’. The projected Brexit dividend of more money (£350
million per week)2 for the National Health Service was therefore particularly
attractive to disadvantaged groups. Sending money annually to Brussels had
become toxic, thereby increasing the sensitivity attached to the exit charge.
Remarkably, the eventuality of such a charge had not featured in the Brexit
Referendum campaign, suggesting a blind spot on both sides about the nature of
the UK’s relationship with the EU.
Without the 2010–2016 period of post-crisis UK ﬁscal austerity, there might not
have been a Brexit majority, even if internal Conservative Party calculations had
led then Prime Minister David Cameron to call an In-Out Referendum. Moreover,
without the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis and the 2009 eurozone crisis, the EU’s
development path would have been different, thereby avoiding the further
disengagement of the UK (Laffan and Schlosser, 2016). Brexit added another
element to the crises already faced by the EU (Laffan, 2016), notably the 2009
eurozone crisis, instability on its Eastern border, and migration ﬂows from failed
states in the Middle East and North Africa. One segment of ‘Brexiter’ opinion
considers this an opportunity to complete those parts of the state-shrinking
Thatcher revolution that had been frustrated by EU membership (Lawson, 2016).
2 The Institute for Fiscal Studies (Emmerson et al., 2016, p. 2) disputed the extra £350 million a week
the Brexit Leave campaign claimed would be available for spending on the NHS after Brexit. This
ﬁgure was calculated without the UK’s receipts from the EU and the Fontainebleau Abatement
being taken into account: the correct ﬁgure was £150 million a week, calculated on the assumption
that Brexit would have no other effect on UK public ﬁnances. Yet the number was widely believed
and has since been repeated by Boris Johnson, the then UK Foreign Secretary, leading to a rebuke
from the Chairman of the Statistics Authority (Norgrove, 2017). The Fontainebleau Abatement
derives from a political deal won by UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1984 whereby a
reduction is applied to the UK gross contribution before money is transferred to the EU. Otherwise,
the UK would be a much larger net contributor to the EU budget (ONS, 2017).
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This aspiration has made the EU27 nervous about its future relationship with the
UK, fearing a tax and regulatory race to the bottom.
Our ﬁrst research objective in investigating the UK’s exit charge from the EU is
to treat the calculation of the exit charge as a natural experiment and illuminate it
using the four modes of government accounting: ﬁnancial reporting, statistical
accounting, budgeting and ﬁscal sustainability projections (Heald and Hodges,
2015). This analysis draws on public documentation and calculations that neither
governments nor supranational organizations would normally reveal. Our second
objective is to take the exit charge as an unusual opportunity for demonstrating
the value of using the four modes of government accounting as an investigative
method, particularly in the current context of austerity.
We explore alternative conceptualizations of the UK’s break from the EU,
noting that adherence to different conceptualizations contributes to conﬂict in
Brexit negotiations. The four modes of government accounting provide the
foundation for our analysis. While we draw on our prior involvement in UK and
EU public sector accounting developments, we have enjoyed no insider access and
have relied on documents in the public domain. This has been less of a
disadvantage than it might seem, because both the EU and UK sides have
extensively leaked to the media their version of the rights and wrongs of the exit
charge. Thus data have become available that EU institutions and governments
would either not calculate (on grounds of hypotheticality) or refuse to release
(on grounds of ‘national’ or ‘supranational’ interest). We have tracked events,
with the Financial Times being particularly useful; drawn on the analysis by the
Ofﬁce for Budget Responsibility (OBR, 2018) of the January 2018 draft
Withdrawal Agreement (European Commission, 2018); and have participated in
seminars held under the Chatham House Rule3 which facilitated contextualization
and interpretation. All have contributed to our understanding of why the Brexit
exit charge has become so conﬂictual.
CONFLICTING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF BREXIT
As in marital divorces, both the UK and the EU secured legal advice conﬁrming
their own position in the ﬁnancial dispute. A report by the House of Lords
European Union Committee (2017, para. 137, p. 39) concluded that, in the
absence of a withdrawal agreement, the UK has no legal obligation to pay to exit,
but that the ‘political and economic consequences … [of not paying] … are likely
to be profound’. No international court would have jurisdiction. The European
Court of Justice (ECJ) would not have jurisdiction because the UK would not be
a Member State. Because the EU is not a state, the International Court of Justice
3 Named after the London headquarters of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Chatham
House Rule governs the conduct of policy seminars at which the identity of speakers and
participants is never made public, but the substance of discussion can be reported on a non-
attributable basis. In particular, this protects civil servants and others in exposed positions.
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would only have jurisdiction if the UK and the other 27 Member States had made
a declaration submitting to its jurisdiction, and they would not have done so. If the
UK were to refuse to pay its liabilities, the EU would not conclude future trading
and other agreements with the UK.
Though evocative shorthand, the divorce conceptualization of Brexit is only one
of those articulated. Others include quitting a club, terminating a contractual
relationship under private law, leaving a treaty-based international organization,
and seceding from a state. Of central importance underlying them is the UK’s
traditional transactional approach to EU membership, always assessing costs and
beneﬁts. This has applied across the UK political spectrum and has characterized
all UK governments since entry into (what became) the EU in 1973. The late-
arriving UK never embraced the existential ‘peace and prosperity’ vision of the
EU that was shared by founder members. Rogers (2017) traced the origins of
Brexit to the 1992 Maastricht UK opt-outs on the single currency and Schengen
border control, and particularly to the 2011 UK veto of treaty changes desired for
purposes of ﬁscal co-ordination by the eurozone countries at the height of their
ﬁscal crisis. It is not that, for example, France and Germany do not themselves
pursue self-interest in economic and ﬁscal matters, but they do share a European
vision to which the UK has never subscribed.
There is irony in that successive UK governments pressed for early membership
for the former communist states in Eastern Europe, with the purpose of diluting
ambitions for political integration on the lines of the ‘ever closer union’ expressed
as a political goal in EU Treaties (Miller, 2015). Although these countries can
behave as transactionally as the UK and therefore should be natural allies,
resentment of Eastern European immigration into the UK was a powerful factor
in the Leave campaign, in turn undermining the potential for Eastern European
states to be UK allies.
The competing conceptualizations are summarized in Table 1, which sets out the
justiﬁcation, the appeal to policy actors, and the ﬁnancial implications if that
conceptualization were adopted.
Brexit as Marital Divorce
Marital divorces are complicated and how they are constructed has undergone
signiﬁcant legal change, particularly affecting ﬁnancial settlements. The English
courts have favoured 50:50 splits of net assets, irrespective of wealth taken into a
marriage, relative earnings during the marriage, and projected future earning
power after the divorce. If Brexit were a marital divorce then, on this basis, the
UK would receive back its share of net assets or pay over its share of net liabilities
at the settlement date. The notion that the exit charge would be calculated on net
assets or net liabilities was rendered implausible by the timing imposed on the UK
by the EU27, once Article 50 had been activated. Although Barker (2017) did
calculations based upon the European Commission’s ﬁnancial accounts, the EU27
has had no intention of letting the UK take away a share of the EU’s net assets.
Disruption having been caused by the UK’s decision to leave, it must pay its share
of ﬁnancial liabilities but would in general have no claim on EU assets. Certainly,
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TABLE 1
CONFLICTING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF BREXIT
Conceptualization Justiﬁcation Appeal Financial Implications
Marital Divorce As a sovereign state, the
UK retains the capacity
to leave the EU, as
recognized in Article
50 of the Treaty of
Lisbon 2007. English
courts increasingly
specify 50-50 splits of
net assets in cases of
marital divorce.
To those who want a
smooth transition to
being outside the EU, so
that the future
relationship can be
negotiated on the basis
of a clean break.
There would be an
economic calculation of
the net assets (or net
liabilities) of the EU,
with the UK ‘taking its
share’ at the settlement
date, whether positive or
negative. There would
be subsidiary
complications: would the
UK share be determined
with reference to its
present GDP share, its
present population
share, or its cumulative
ﬁnancial contribution
over its membership
years (or some subset
thereof)?
Quitting a
Membership
Club
Once having joined and
abided by membership
rules, termination is
solely a decision for the
member.
To those Brexiters who
regard the EU as a
membership club and
wish to re-allocate their
subscription to other
expenditures or reduced
taxation.
Joining a membership club
usually involves paying a
joining fee (which might
loosely be interpreted as
relating to existing assets
such as valuable land)
and then an annual
membership fee. The
departing member does
not receive a share of
net assets at the date of
departure nor has to
fund a share of net
liabilities, which might
relate to employee
pension liabilities and
negligence claims.
Termination of
Commercial
Contract
A commercial relationship
will only survive long-
term if both always see
future beneﬁts to
themselves.
To the UK, which has held
a transactional approach
to EU membership,
always assessing costs
and beneﬁts. (The late-
arriving UK never
embraced the existential
‘peace and prosperity’
vision that was shared
by founder members.)
Market logic applies to
such terminations, both
sides calculating what
they can get. When
disposing of a
shareholding in a quoted
company, a shareholder
sells those shares for
their current market
value, not returning
them to the company at
par or issue value.
Leaving a Treaty-
based
International
Organization
Article 70 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law
of Treaties 1969
provides a fall-back
To Brexiters, as there are
precedents of countries
withdrawing from
Treaty-based
As from the termination
date, Article
70(1a) removes future
obligations to conform
(Continues)
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TABLE 1
CONTINUED
Conceptualization Justiﬁcation Appeal Financial Implications
position if the treaty in
question does not have
a termination procedure
under its provisions or if
the parties do not
otherwise agree.
international
organizations without
incurring continuing
ﬁnancial obligations, as
with the United States’
decision to leave
UNESCO in 2018,
having suspended its
subscriptions since 2011
(UNESCO, 2017).
to the Treaty, but
Article 70(1b) conﬁrms
rights and obligations as
at termination date. This
underpins the EU
contention that the UK
cannot simply walk
away. Because Article
50 includes an exit
provision, the Vienna
Convention only
becomes directly
relevant if there is no
agreement on the draft
Withdrawal Agreement
currently being
negotiated by the EU
and the UK.
Secession from a
State
Although the scope of the
right to self-determina-
tion in international law
outside the colonial
context is not entirely
clear, nationalist
movements typically
argue that ‘peoples’
have a right to self-
determination and to
(re)-establish their own
sovereignty.
To the EU27, as it protects
the short-run budgetary
position. Analogously to
the EU position on
Brexit, the UK
Government, at the time
of the Scottish
Independence
Referendum in 2014,
stated that a departing
Scotland would have no
claim on UK assets but
would have to assume
its share of UK
liabilities, such as the
national debt (Treasury,
2014).
Unless the UK were to
pay the present value of
all foregone future net
contributions, Brexit will
damage EU ﬁscal
sustainability because it
removes a large net
contributor. The EU27
stated that ‘all
commitments
undertaken by the
28 member states should
be honoured by the
28 member states. No
member should pay
more and no member
should receive less
because of the UK’s
decision to leave the
EU’ (Schinas, 2017).
The ‘no worse off’
principle is narrowed by
the reference to
honouring
‘commitments’: the
liabilities and the
contingent liabilities of
the EU on Brexit day,
and to the working
through of the 2014-20
Multiannual Financial
Framework.
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this will not be a divorce of the kind obtainable from the English courts at the
dissolution of a marriage.
Brexit as Quitting a Membership Club
The intense UK political and media rhetoric about extortion and ‘let the EU go
whistle’ included indications that leading Brexiters likened Brexit to leaving a
club. Joining a club usually involves paying a joining fee and then an annual
membership fee.4 If the member exits the club, they would give a period of notice,
and settle any outstanding fees and charges. But the departing member does not
receive a share of net assets at the date of departure nor does it have to fund a
share of net liabilities. The UK was perhaps never serious in claiming a share of
net assets, but it would like the clean break of the club scenario. However, the
major ﬁgures of the EU27 do not see the EU as analogous to a membership club;
they hold departing members responsible for their share of liabilities and
contingent liabilities.
Brexit as Terminating a Commercial Contract
In a commercial contractual relationship between two private entities, the
relationship will only survive long term if both parties see future gain to
themselves. This sense of continuous calculation is close to the UK’s transactional
approach, but alien to the European vision (Laffan 2016; Rogers, 2017). In the
days when the large auditing ﬁrms were partnerships, one bought into the
partnership at entry and was bought out at exit. Because of unlimited liability one
was jointly and severally liable during the partnership but free from liability after
departure.
Brexit as Leaving a Treaty-based International Organization
Countries can walk out of international organizations because of policy
disagreements, with any ﬁnancial payments dependent on the power of the
departing state. A recent example is the US’s decision to leave UNESCO in 2018,
having suspended subscriptions since 2011 (UNESCO, 2017). Article 70 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 19695 provides a fall-back position if
the treaty in question does not have a termination procedure under its provisions
or if the parties do not otherwise agree. As from the termination date, Article
70(1a) removes future obligations to conform to the treaty, but Article
70(1b) conﬁrms rights and obligations as at termination date. This perhaps informs
the EU contention that the UK cannot simply walk away. However, the EU does
not see itself as such an international treaty organization, but as a supranational
organization in the process of political and economic integration from which
accessions would not be reversed. Nevertheless, Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon
4 The example of leaving a golf club was cited by Brexiters, perhaps to suggest the lack of
fundamental importance of the relationship.
5 See https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf
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includes an exit provision so the Vienna Convention only becomes directly
relevant if there is no withdrawal agreement between the EU and the UK.
Brexit as Secession from a State
The EU is not yet a state, so the analogy is stretched. The European
Commission’s chief spokesman captured the EU27 view of the UK Brexit ﬁnancial
liability in a letter to the Financial Times (Schinas, 2017):
… all commitments undertaken by the 28 member states should be honoured by the
28 member states. No member should pay more and no member should receive less
because of the UK’s decision to leave the EU.
This characterizes the UK as the disrupter of EU ﬁnances and contends that no
other Member State should be worse off because of Brexit. There are fears that
the Eastern European Member States would receive less subsidy and/or that
Germany and others would have to pay more. Another example of ‘the-disrupter-
should-pay’ principle would be charging the UK with the costs of re-locating the
European Banking Authority and the European Medicines Agency out of the
UK. Unless the UK were to pay the present value of all foregone future net
contributions, Brexit will damage EU ﬁscal sustainability because it removes a
large net contributor. The application of the ‘no damage’ principle is narrowed in
the above quotation by the reference to honouring ‘commitments’, that is,
liabilities and contingent liabilities of the EU on Brexit day, and to the working
through of the budgetary commitments contained in the 2014–20 Multiannual
Financial Framework (MFF) (European Commission, undated 1). This EU
position is analogous to that of the UK Government during the 2014 Scottish
Independence Referendum, when it argued that a departing Scotland would have
no claim on UK assets but would have to assume its share of UK liabilities, such
as the national debt (Treasury, 2014).
In summary, two conclusions deserve emphasis. First, much argument is
opportunistic, with actors calling on principles that support their desired outcome.
This is no surprise but it makes satisfactory resolution more difﬁcult when public
positions harden and UK negotiators expected allegations of betrayal and sabotage
from behind them. Second, conﬂicting understandings of the UK–EU relationship
coalesce with deliberate misinterpretations of accounting and statistical data. We
now turn for illumination to the four modes of government accounting.
FOUR MODES OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING
Power politics dominated the fraught exit charge negotiations between the UK
and the EU. On 12 June 2017, the EU27 published a statement of principles
governing the calculation (European Commission, 2017a) whereas the UK
consistently refused to state publicly its position, while engaging in political
rhetoric. A conditional offer of circa €20 billion was made in the UK Prime
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Minister’s Florence speech on 22 September 2017 (May, 2017b), designed to tone
down the toxicity that had built up after her Lancaster House speech on
17 January 2017 (May, 2017a).
Pioneering work in the 2000s by Frank Eich, who was then responsible for the
UK Treasury’s long-term ﬁscal projections, is conveniently summarized in Eich
(2008). Figure 1 reproduces his conceptualization of the public sector balance
sheet. This facilitates an exposition of the four modes of government accounting:
ﬁnancial reporting, statistical accounting, ﬁscal sustainability projections, and
budgeting.
In countries that have led public sector accounting reform, accrual accounting
has replaced variants of cash accounting and modiﬁed accruals. Figure 1 has four
quadrants, the vertical dimension distinguishing between assets and liabilities and
the horizontal dimension between events in the past and in the future. It
illuminates the gains from having a public sector balance sheet, but also the gaps
that affect—to varying degrees—both ﬁnancial reporting and statistical
accounting. The shaded rectangles are those included in a ﬁnancial reporting
balance sheet. The unshaded ‘Future liabilities incurred in the future’ is an
important omission.
Whereas ﬁnancial reporting provides comprehensive coverage of liabilities
accumulated to date (the bottom left quadrant), statistical accounting generally
does not include provisions that arise from past events. Both modes of
accounting attach central importance to recognition criteria. For example,
certain items are not recognized in balance sheets because they are executory
contracts, meaning that there is no accounting recognition until delivery.
FIGURE 1
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR BALANCE SHEET
Source: Eich (2008, Chart 3.3).
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Therefore, though organizations have contractual obligations to employees,
future employment costs are not put in the balance sheet as liabilities. Until
relatively recently, public sector organizations did not report accrued employee
pensions liabilities.
Public sector balance sheets do not include future taxation revenue (top right
quadrant). Of most relevance in the present context is what lies in the bottom
right quadrant:
a. future liabilities from past activities (which ﬁnancial reporting seeks to cover
comprehensively, unlike statistical accounting); and
b. future liabilities incurred in the future.
The innovation of ﬁscal sustainability projections directs attention to (b), which
fail accounting recognition criteria but which hang over future public ﬁnances. An
example is the to-be-accrued pension liabilities arising from the future
employment of existing and new public employees. Unlike (a), these fail
accounting recognition criteria, being treated as executory contracts.
With regard to the top left quadrant, ﬁnancial reports are prepared on the
going-concern convention: the default assumption is that the organization will
continue in broadly the same shape, irrespective of whether the measurement
basis is historic cost or some form of current cost or fair value accounting.
Herein lies one difﬁculty for exit charge calculations that seek a basis in annual
ﬁnancial reports. For example, the reported net assets of the European
Investment Bank (EIB) are irrelevant to a calculation that includes an offset for
assets. The relevant number would be the UK’s share of the hypothetical
ﬂotation value of the EIB.
Fiscal sustainability analysis, taken over from the UK Treasury on the
establishment of the Ofﬁce for Budget Responsibility in 2010, is relevant to the exit
charge. This involves forecasting cash ﬂows over 50-year and inﬁnite time horizons,
on the basis of ‘existing policies’. The calculation of ﬁscal gaps indicates the extent
of ﬁscal unsustainability to be resolved by increases in taxation or reductions in
expenditure. Even at the national level, there are serious difﬁculties in establishing
in operational terms what constitutes existing government policies. The economic
and demographic uncertainties are profound. What happens over time, in terms of
crystallization of the contingent liabilities relating to the increasingly complex EU
ﬁnancial architecture, should be of profound importance to the exit charge
calculation. If assumptions are made now, a lump-sum exit charge can be calculated,
whether that is handed over as a single payment or in stages. Alternatively, the ﬁnal
amount of the exit charge will be inﬂuenced by future economic conditions and EU
decision making on how to manage liabilities (such as the indexation of EU
employee pensions) and contingent liabilities (such as the future willingness to write
off EU loans to organizations and countries, including Member States).
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Notwithstanding the focus on accounting that is emphasized by the quadrants of
Figure 1, there is plenty of evidence that it is budgeting that decision makers care
about, much more than the later ﬁnancial reports (Public Administration and
Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2017). Unlike statistical accounting
(on Eurostat standards) and ﬁnancial reporting (more harmonization broadly on
IFRS/IPSAS standards), budgeting processes remain largely the responsibility of
nation states. There are wide differences, especially on the breadth of coverage of
public institutions and in the accounting basis (cash, accruals, or variants). The
common feature is that executive decision making (Diamond, 2013) and the
acquisition of legitimacy through legislative endorsement (Lienert, 2013) both use
budgeting numbers, however those are constructed.
Of critical importance is the way in which the EU conducts its ﬁnancial
programming within the framework of the 2014–20 MFF. This is not a seven-year
budget but facilitates the implementation of common policies and informs
beneﬁciaries and ﬁnance ministries. The MFF follows a special acceptance
procedure: proposed by the European Commission, voted on by the European
Parliament on a Yes/No non-amendable basis, after which the European Council
can make changes without going back to the Parliament. The MFF has been
regarded as binding by recipient and contributing countries, though actual
payments can be frustrated by restricting the annual budget. Unspent funds in the
MFF accumulate, and are known as Reste à liquider (RAL). De Wilde (2012)
found that the MFF process was characterized by intergovernmental polarization
(each Member State calculating its contributions or receipts) rather than
transnational polarization (interest groups coalescing across Member States).
The point to be stressed is the different ways in which the UK and EU
undertake their budgeting. The UK has Spending Reviews; their periodicity, years
covered, and content are under Treasury control. Spending Reviews are
conducted on an accruals basis and tend to cover three years ahead; they are
never voted by Parliament. Formal authorization, again on an accruals basis, takes
place after the ﬁnancial year has started, through what is known as the supply
procedure. Unspent amounts in voted estimates expire at ﬁnancial year-end, and
have to be voted again, even when the Treasury has operated a carry-over system.
In 2010, the incoming Coalition Government cancelled all accumulated end-year
ﬂexibility that had built up during the 1997–2010 Labour Government.
In contrast, the EU operates on a dual commitments (seven-year MFF) and
payments (annual budget) basis, in which unspent commitments carry forward and
do not automatically expire, though they can be decommitted. Hawkish Member
State attitudes to authorizing payments in the annual budget, often with the UK in
the forefront, have prevented commitments in the MFF being fully funded for
individual years, leading to a build-up of unexpired commitments (i.e., RAL).6
Working from its own practices, the UK thinks of unspent commitments on
6 There was a large build-up of unspent MFF allocations during the 2007–2013 period, due in part to
the global ﬁnancial recession leading to austerity measures in most countries which inhibited co-
ﬁnancing.
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30 March 2019 as not being its responsibility. In contrast, net recipient EU27
countries are programming that expenditure into the 2020s, considering the MFF
amounts to be a binding obligation on all the EU28.
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE BREXIT CHARGE DISPUTE
In terms of headline numbers, the European Commission asked for circa €60
billion and the UK, after initially denying that it had anything to pay, made what
was interpreted as an offer of €20 billion in the Prime Minister’s Florence speech
(May, 2017b). It did not seem coincidental that €20 billion is about two years’ UK
net contribution, thereby ﬁlling the budgetary hole in the ﬁnal two years of the
2014–20 MFF. Sterling depreciation of 14% against the euro since the Brexit
Referendum increased the sterling cost of the exit charge payable in euros
(European Commission, 2017a).
Much discussion about the exit charge has centred around the EU budget and
the European Commission consolidated ﬁnancial report. However, there is a much
broader context, as shown in Figure 2, which is a schematic representation of an
FIGURE 2
THE WHOLE PICTURE OF EU FINANCES
Notes: The size of the circle does not correspond to actual values. EDF stands for European
Development Fund, EFSI is European Fund for Strategic Investments and EFSM stands for European
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism.
Source: This schematic diagram is based on European Commission (2017b).
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ofﬁcial diagram (European Commission, 2017b, p. 9). Figure 2 demonstrates the
increasingly complex EU architecture. The shaded circle represents the EU
budget, which might be thought of as a planet. There are many moons, some
intersecting with the EU budget and falling within what is known as ‘full EU
accountability’ (represented by the outer circle). This term means that the
organizations and/or funds are audited by the European Court of Auditors (ECA)
and subject to discharge by the European Parliament.
On the right of Figure 2 and intersecting with the EU budget and full EU
accountability is a circle representing the EIB, which is an EU institution not
consolidated in the accounts of the European Commission. The area of
intersection contains, for example: ﬁnancial instruments and EIB shares (within
the EU budget); European Fund for Strategic Investments guarantees (partly
inside the EU budget and wholly within the outer circle of full EU accountability);
and the European Financial Stability Mechanism and Euratom loans (outside the
EU budget but inside the outer circle). Contingent liabilities sometimes overlap
the budget, and sometimes do not.
On the left of Figure 2, outside both the EU budget and full EU accountability,
are the institutions connected to the eurozone, notably the European Central
Bank (ECB) and the European Stability Mechanism. The UK’s multiple opt-outs
mean that it has limited involvement in this area. Moreover, the difﬁculty of
making treaty revisions, to which the UK has contributed, has increased the use of
intergovernmental agreements between subsets of EU Member States. This is also
a mechanism by which Member States, acting through the European Council,
bypass the European Commission (Laffan and Schlosser, 2016).
In summary, this architecture reﬂects not only the growing complexity arising
from the co-existence of the eurozone 19 and the non-eurozone 9, but also off-
balance sheet activity on behalf of the EU28 and political competition between
Member States and the European Commission. Sinn (2015) has criticized these
developments as constituting a ‘shadow budget’ which—if not checked—will grow
non-transparently alongside tight control of the EU budget.
If Brexit were analogous to a divorce on the basis of a pro rata split of net
assets, there would be a valuation on Brexit day of everything in Figure 2 relating
to the UK. Barker (2017) attached a total EU assets valuation of €22.5 billion,
providing the UK with an offset of €2.7 billion (12% share) or €3.4 billion (15%
share).7 Alongside France, Germany, and Italy, the UK is the equal largest
shareholder in the EIB, with 16.11%. Ceasing to be an EU Member State renders
it legally unable to continue as a shareholder. The EU27 have no intention of
allowing the UK to take core assets with it; Brexit is seen as analogous to
secession, not to divorce, and discouraging imitation is a high priority.
Several complications for the ﬁnancial settlement have arisen since the
activation of Article 50. First, the EU view of the likely UK exit liability was ﬁrst
promulgated by well-briefed articles in the Financial Times (summarized in
7 The 12% share relates to the average of UK net contributions after the Fontainebleau Abatement,
15% to before the Abatement (Barker, 2017, p. 9).
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Barker, 2017), providing indicative numbers for total EU liabilities and alternative
methodologies for calculating the UK share. One of Barker’s calculations is
summarized in Table 2. On a UK share of 15%, Barker shows Total Liabilities
(€73.3 billion), and Contingent Liabilities (€11.9 billion), against which are €18.4
billion of possible offsets. That gives a total of €66.8 billion. The comparable ﬁgure
on a 12% share is €51.4 billion.
In June 2017 came the ofﬁcial publication of the EU’s principles for calculating
the exit charge, though without numbers (European Commission, 2017a). The
numbers reported by Barker (2017) were interpreted in the UK as an opening
gambit: however, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission,
noted that the ﬁnancial calculations were more complex than expected, but that
the British would ‘have to pay’ (Juncker, 2017). In contrast, the UK Government
has never published its own analysis of the UK liability, though ministers
rubbished the EU ﬁgures as extortion, punishment, and ransom. It became clear
that UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s pre-Referendum instruction that the
civil service would make no preparations for Brexit had been obeyed. The UK
argument that it would accept liability only for those EU-employee pensioners
who are UK nationals was clumsy (if it were a tactical ploy to have something to
concede later on) or inﬂammatory (if serious).
Second, the UK’s liability is affected by the appearance on the UK agenda of a
‘transition period’ after 29 March 2019, possibly of two years. During this period, the
UK would be in the departure lounge: not a Member State, so having no
representation, but subject to the usual budgetary contributions, all EU law (including
that newly coming into force), and subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ. Although
seemingly implausible in the aftermath of the Brexit Referendum, this ‘transition
TABLE 2
ALEX BARKER’S BREXIT BILL SPECIMEN CALCULATIONS
EU end 2018 UK share 12% UK share 15%
€ billion € billion € billion
Pensions 63.80 7.70 9.60
Reste à liquider (at end 2018) 241.00 29.20 36.20
Other 172.40 22.60 27.60
Total Liabilities 477.20 59.60 73.30
Guarantees/provisions 23.10 2.80 3.50
EU loans 56.10 6.80 8.40
Total Contingent Liabilities 79.20 9.60 11.90
Total of Liabilities and Contingent Liabilities 559.70 69.10 85.20
Assets 22.50 2.70 3.40
UK rebate for 2018 (approx) - 6.00 6.00
Receipts for UK projects (approx) 9.00 9.00 9.00
Possible Offsets 31.50 17.70 18.40
Note: There are some rounding errors in the original source.
Source: Barker (2017, p. 10).
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period’ (EU terminology) or ‘implementation period’ (UK terminology) is included in
the draft Withdrawal Agreement (European Commission, 2018). Signiﬁcantly, the
EU restricted duration to 21 months whereas the UK had asked for 24 months: this
means that the UK effectively leaves on 31 December 2020, the ﬁnal day of the
2014–20 MFF.
Such an arrangement solves the short-term budgetary gap which worries both
net recipient and net contributing Member States, as two more years of the
2014–20 MFF will have expired. However, the issue of unspent commitments
remains: on past experience, signiﬁcant amounts of RAL will continue until at
least 2023, and some for much longer (European Commission, 2015). Further
involvement of the ECJ and the ECA crosses ‘red lines’ set by the UK
Government for internal party management purposes. Another issue is that
impending Brexit may reduce the amount of EU receipts (e.g., from competitively
tendered programmes such as Horizon 2020) and thus increase the exit charge
beyond estimated amounts.
Third, threats to ﬁscal transparency have become evident. Having elevated the
exit charge to such prominence, the pressures to conceal the amounts payable
mounted. Rather than a clean break (pay the agreed ﬁnancial liability as a lump
sum as total discharge, then pay for participation in particular programmes), there
will be staged payments. Payments that arise from treaty obligations generally fall
within the accepted areas where UK payments can be classiﬁed as Consolidated
Fund Standing Service, which leads to an automatic charge on the Consolidated
Fund without requiring parliamentary approval. Under the European Union
(Withdrawal) Act 2018, this requirement could be inserted by secondary legislation.
Because of RAL from successive MFFs and the gradual crystallization of contingent
liabilities, this situation could exist for a very long time (OBR, 2018).
Inadequate attention has been paid to the build-up of EU contingent liabilities,
an unsurprising development after long periods of tight control over EU
expenditure. There could be EU27 demands for further payments for several
decades as these contingent liabilities crystallize (NAO, 2018). This crystallization
process will be managed by the EU27, with the UK having no role in decisions
that inﬂuence those amounts, for example, debt write-offs from the EU budget to
EU institutions and third parties.
RESOLVING THE DISPUTE
The draft Withdrawal Agreement (European Commission, 2018) speciﬁes calculation
principles, without attaching numbers. Fortunately, these numbers fall within the
remit of the OBR which has published estimated payments (OBR, 2018, Annex B)
subsequent to an explanatory letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the
Chair of the Treasury Committee (Hammond, 2018). The total exit charge is
estimated as €41.4 billion, roughly midway between Barker (2017) and May (2017b).
The upper part of Table 3 shows UK payments if the UK were to remain in the
EU. The lower part shows UK payments with the UK leaving the EU on
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29 March 2019. Whereas the UK operates on ﬁnancial years ending 31 March, the
EU has a year-end of 31 December. The Brexit date means that, in calendar year
2019, the UK would be a Member State from 1 January to 29 March, but thereafter
a ‘third country’. Moreover, the EU does not call for money on an even basis: the
OBR (2018) has estimated the seasonal proﬁle in its calculations. The membership
calculations cease part way through 2019, with exit charge payments taking over.
The bottom line of Table 3 shows the annual path of payments from 2019.
Although no longer a Member State from 30 March 2019, the UK would be
ﬁnancially treated as such until 31 December 2020. In 2023, the Leave payments
will be €2.9 billion in comparison with the Remain payments of €9.7 billion. The
layout of Table 3 shows how the total UK contribution depends signiﬁcantly on
public sector net receipts and private sector receipts. In the latest outturn year
(2018), these offset 40% of the gross contribution and—without Brexit—would
have been forecast to offset 47% in 2023. A ﬁscal risk is that a combination of
continued austerity (affecting the capacity to meet co-funding requirements) and
of unwillingness to engage in the context of Brexit (or being frozen out by EU27
partners) will lead to a shortfall in UK receipts.
The size of the exit charge depends on the base date from which it is calculated.
If calculated from the day after Brexit day (30 March 2019), the OBR (2018, para.
B.35) states it to be €41.4 billion. Using its forecast of exchange rates, this converts
to £37.1 billion. If calculated from the date (1 January 2021) when the EU ﬁnancial
regime ceases to apply to the UK, the exit charge would be €22.9 billion.
Figure 3 plots the OBR’s (2018) estimates of the time proﬁle of ﬁnancial
settlement payments, beginning from 30 March 2019 (i.e., after Brexit but before
FIGURE 3
THE TIME PROFILE OF EXIT PAYMENTS (€ BILLION)
Source: OBR (2018), Chart B.3. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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detachment). These payments are heavily bunched in the ﬁnal two years of MFF
2014–20 and in the next three years when much of the estimated €256.4 billion
post-2020 RAL is expected to be disbursed. From 2025 annual payments fall
below €1 billion. The draft Withdrawal Agreement (European Commission, 2018,
Article 135, para 5(b)) contains a provision that the UK could then ask to settle
all outstanding pension liabilities in ﬁve equal annual instalments.
Whereas Barker (2017, shown earlier as Table 2) had suggested signiﬁcant
numbers for the UK’s share of Liabilities and Contingent Liabilities, Figure 4
suggests that the settlement of non-MFF and non-RAL liabilities involves
numbers that are small in this context. Above the horizontal axis is plotted the
UK’s payment of its share of EU pension liabilities, running on until 2064. There
is no mention in the draft Withdrawal Agreement (European Commission, 2018)
of the UK paying compensation for the relocation of the European Banking
Authority (Paris) or the European Medicines Agency (Amsterdam).
Below the horizontal axis is plotted the UK’s receipts from reimbursements
related to its stake in certain EU assets. The solid black line shows the net
position, which turns negative in 2031. The most important inﬂow relates to
repayment in 11 instalments of €0.3 billion and one of €195.9 million of the UK’s
paid-in capital in the EIB. This capital was contributed in years from 1973, but
returns in much depreciated currency represent a fraction of the potential market
FIGURE 4
PROFILE OF PAYMENTS WITH REGARD TO LIABILITIES AND ASSETS (€ BILLION)
Source: Ofﬁce for Budget Responsibility (2018), Chart B.2, with simpliﬁcations.
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value of the UK’s stake of 16.11%. The UK remains liable up to its subscribed
capital of €39.15 billion until the EIB’s projects as at 29 March 2019 have ceased
to be at risk. It is likely that other asset returns have been agreed on
disadvantageous terms for the UK because current values are not being used. For
example, in 2021 the UK will receive €55.51 million for its 13.6743% stake in
the ECB.
CONCLUSION
This analysis of the UK’s exit charge not only informs our understanding of this
speciﬁc case, but also raises wider issues for public sector accounting research.
Examining the issues through the lenses of the four modes of government
accounting at a time of austerity brings these into focus.
The ﬁrst research objective has been to use the four modes of accounting to
illuminate the conﬂict over the calculation of the exit charge which drew heavily
on ﬁnancial reporting numbers. That conﬂict derived in part from conﬂicting
conceptualizations of EU membership, ranging from the Brexiter notion that this
was like leaving a membership club to the EU27 view that Brexit, though legally
permissible under the Treaty of Lisbon, was comparable to secession. The
treatment of the UK’s stake in the EIB is disadvantageous to the UK, and one of
the clearest indicators that this is viewed by the EU27 as secession. The analysis
supports the rejection of the marital divorce, membership club, and commercial
analogies, leaving only secession and quitting a treaty-based organization; the
latter became the UK Government’s implicit negotiation position when the
realities of negotiations showed that the other analogies were unviable.
The postponement of de facto Brexit to 31 December 2020 reduced the size of
the exit charge because of €18.5 billion being incurred between 30 March 2019
and 31 December 2020, during which time the UK will be treated ﬁnancially ‘as if’
a Member State. However, this does not affect the money being paid over, as it
constitutes a switch of headings from exit charge to net contribution over the
21-month transition period. A future risk to the UK is that the outturn exit charge
will be higher if Contingent Liabilities, prominent in Table 2 (Barker), but missing
from Table 3 (Ofﬁce for Budget Responsibility), were to crystallize on a large
scale.
Much negotiating conﬂict could have been avoided by an early UK offer to
meet its net contribution for the last two years (2019 and 2020) of the 2014-20
MFF, including its share of RAL from 2021 onwards. This was conceded in
Theresa May’s Florence speech (May, 2017b), the EU27 then insisting on the
transition period ending on 31 December 2020, the same day as the 2014-20 MFF.
It is budgeting that really matters in the EU, where that is understood to include
the MFF system and its RAL procedure (D’Alfonso and Sapala, 2015). The
departure of a large net-contributing Member State has long-term implications for
the ﬁscal sustainability of the EU budget and EU institutions more generally. By
removing one of the most aggressive hawks on EU spending, Brexit may shift the
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balance of power away from Northern Europe, with conﬂicts over redistribution under
MFF 2021-28 overlapping with those over threats to judicial and media independence
in Eastern Europe. The notion of ﬁscal sustainability that shaped the EU negotiating
position was a narrow one relating only to the 2014-20 MFF. In the background are the
macroeconomic imbalances of the eurozone and tensions between Member States,
particularly in relation to European Commission ﬁscal surveillance of Member States,
using statistical accounting measures of deﬁcit and debt.
Especially in times of austerity, access to public resources is determined by the
budgeting mode, thereby explaining its centrality to political decision making: the
EU emphasized the protection of commitments made in the 2014-20 MFF. The
EU27 Member States supported the Commission, aware that shortfalls from
Brexit would affect their statistical accounting data used for external ﬁscal
surveillance. The calculation of the exit charge mostly derived from IPSAS-based
ﬁnancial reporting ﬁgures (Grossi and Soverchia, 2011), and notes to the accounts
such as on contingent liabilities, on which the UK could make payments until
2064. Austerity has been required for reasons of ﬁscal sustainability following the
2008 global ﬁnancial crisis and uneven growth within the eurozone, though
measures taken to repair current deﬁcits and reduce accumulated debt might
damage long-term ﬁscal sustainability by depressing economic growth.
The exit charge has been an opportunity to explore the complementary roles of the
four modes of government accounting in constructing an overall, ﬁscally transparent
picture. An underlying problem is that all public spending numbers are large, and the
lack of public understanding of their relative importance has a distortionary effect on
public debates (Heald, 2012). The numerical signiﬁcance of the net budgetary
contribution and exit charge has been so exaggerated in UK politics that any number
would have been politically toxic. Insiders know the ﬁscal irrelevance of the annual
net contribution and exit charge compared to other likely effects of Brexit, yet some
have been willing to accept far larger damage to UK public ﬁnances by risking a cliff-
edge exit with no agreement (that became known as ‘No Deal’).
The EU uses the 2012 Fiscal Compact8 to tighten its ﬁscal control over Member
States, including surveillance of contingent liabilities. Because the UK exercised its
veto on treaty change, the Fiscal Compact was implemented through a 2012
intergovernmental treaty signed by all Member States except the UK and the
Czech Republic. It represents a stricter version of the EU Stability and Growth
Pact (European Commission, undated 2), accompanied by tighter enforcement by the
European Commission. Yet, as Figure 2 demonstrates, the EU itself has developed
off-balance sheet devices. The EIB is not consolidated in the accounts of the
European Commission, and the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) is a
joint venture between the European Commission and the EIB. Infrastructure projects
can then be delivered in Member States through EFSI projects, including public–
8
‘The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union
(TSCG) was formally concluded on 2 March 2012, and entered into force on 1 January 2013. The
main provision of this Treaty is the requirement to have a balanced budget rule in domestic legal
orders (the Fiscal Compact)’ (European Commission, 2017c).
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private partnerships that are designed to meet the criteria established by Eurostat
(2016). This allows off-balance sheet treatment in statistical accounts, whatever the
ﬁnancial reporting treatment under IPSAS 32 (IPSASB, 2011).
Turning to the second research question, our analysis shows that the contest
between modes of government accounting is not just in the political environment
but in technical practice. Combining insights from the four modes contributes
strongly to ﬁscal transparency. Budgeting is central to authorization and
legitimacy; ﬁnancial reporting increasingly conforms to international standards;
and harmonized statistical accounting provides the data for external ﬁscal
surveillance (Heald, 2013). Although less widespread and inevitably model-based,
ﬁscal sustainability reporting brings in long-term obligations that fail the
recognition tests of ﬁnancial reporting and statistical accounting.
This analysis emphasizes the importance of consolidation and the temptations
that public decision makers face to put activities off-balance sheet. Bergmann et al.
(2016) attribute the growing attention in OECD countries to consolidated
government ﬁnancial reporting to the increasing fragmentation of government, in
part due to the inﬂuence of new public management. Consolidated information
can provide an overview of the ﬁnancial performance and position of government
which the accounts of individual entities cannot do. As accruals-based government
ﬁnancial reporting takes hold, consolidation brings useful information about the
‘whole picture’ (Bergmann, 2014; Heald and Georgiou, 2011), bringing to the fore
activities that would otherwise not be visible. Faced by such constraints,
governments and international institutions seek off-balance sheet mechanisms to
achieve policy objectives without the transactions being recorded as public
expenditure or as public debt. Both ﬁnancial reporting and statistical accounting
are vulnerable, meaning that constant vigilance by standard setters is essential.
A warning to accounting standard setters and to public sector accounting
researchers is that, in particular political circumstances, expert opinion can be
trumped by lack of understanding and/or wilful misinterpretation of data. The
technical accomplishment of government ﬁnancial reporting changes has not been
matched by success at communicating government ﬁnancial performance. The
questions of accessibility, intelligibility, and actual use should be high on the
agenda of standard setters, governments, and public sector accounting researchers.
POSTSCRIPT
When this article was completed in November 2018, the UK was scheduled to
leave the EU on 29 March 2019. Opposed by both ‘Remainers’ and hard-line
‘Brexiters’, including MPs in the Conservative Party, UK Prime Minister Theresa
May was unable to pass the necessary legislation through the House of Commons
to authorize the Withdrawal Agreement. The EU granted the UK an extension
until 31 October 2019. She resigned as Leader of the Conservative Party on
7 June, staying on as Prime Minister until the result of the party leadership ballot
was declared on 23 July. Having deﬁnitively committed to leaving the EU on
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31 October, the newly elected Leader, Boris Johnson, became Prime Minister on
24 July. Unless the EU grant a ‘better’ Withdrawal Agreement by 31 October,
which it has steadfastly refused to do, Johnson has committed himself to a ‘No
Deal’ Brexit (i.e., exit without agreement) on that day, and has stated that he will
withhold the exit charge.
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